State v. Ortiz Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 35278 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-11-2009
State v. Ortiz Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35278
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ortiz Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35278" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2101.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2101
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 








BRIEF OF RESPONDENT i sup;s,wi,e L._. coun _ I - ~ o u ~  of Appe~.Is-- ---, 
Entered on ATS by: =:;--,,-.. 
1."- "- 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN HEATHER M. CARLSON 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of  Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-2712 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 







STATE OF IDAHO, 
\ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, j NO. 35278 
1 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN HEATHER M. CARLSON 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-2712 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... I 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ I 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................... I 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 5 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 6 
I. Ortiz Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of 
Establishing That The District Court Abused 
Its Discretion In Admitting Evidence Of Typical 
.................................................. Methamphetamine Use At Trial 6 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 6 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................... 6 
C. The District Court Utilized The Proper Standard .............. 7 
D. The District Court Properly Exercised Its 
Discretion In Determining That The Probative 
Value Of The Evidence Was Not Substantially 
............. Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 8 
II. Ortiz Has Failed To Establish Error, Much Less 
Fundamental Error, In Relation To Any Of The 
Prosecutor's Comments During Closing Argument .................. 13 
A. Introduction .................................................................... 13 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... 13 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Evidence ............ 14 
Ill. There Is No Cumulative Error ................................................... 20 
............................................................................................ CONCLUSION .21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 22 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Darden v . Wainwriqht. 477 U.S. 168 (1986) ....................................................... 14 
Donnellv v . DeChristoforo. 41 6 U.S. 637 (1 974) ................................................. 15 
Herrina v . New York. 422 U.S. 853 (1975) .......................................................... 16 
LaBelle v . State. 130 Idaho 115. 937 P.2d 427 (Ct . App . 1997) ......................... 21 
Smith v . Phillips. 455 U.S. 209 (1982) ................................................................ 14 
State v . Ames. 109 Idaho 373. 707 P.2d 484 (Ct . App . 1985) ............................ 15 
State v . Barcella. 135 Idaho 191. 16 P.3d 288 (Ct . App . 2000) .......................... 21 
State v . Birkia. 126 Idaho 498. 887 P.2d 43 (Ct . App . 1994) ................................ 6 
State v . Enno. 119 Idaho 392. 807 P.2d 610 (1991) ............................................. 6 
State v . Estes. 11 1 Idaho 423. 725 P.2d 128 (1986) .......................................... 15 
State v . Field. 144 Idaho 559. 165 P.3d 273 (2007) ........................................... 15 
............................... State v . Flovd. 125 Idaho 651. 873 P.2d 905 (Ct . App . 1994) 8 
.............................. State v . Gray. 129 Idaho 784. 932 P.2d 907 (Ct . App . 1997) 21 
............................ State v . Groce. 133 Idaho 144. 983 P.2d 217 (Ct . App . 1999) 11 
State v . Hairston. 133 Idaho 496. 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) .................................... 15 
.......................... State v . Hawkins. 131 Idaho 396. 958 P.2d 22 (Ct . App . 1998) 21 
State v . Leavitt. 116 Idaho 285. 775 P.2d 599 (1989) ........................................... 8 
State v . Martin. 118 Idaho 334. 796 P.2d 1007 (1 990) ......................................... 8 
State v . Martinez, 125 Idaho 445. 872 P.2d 708 (1 994) ...................................... 20 
. .................. State v . Missamore. 114 Idaho 879. 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct . App 1988) 15 
State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 862 P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1993) ............................ 8 
State v. Phillips, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007) ................................................... 16 
.......................................... State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 948 P.2d 127 (1997) 15 
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 81 6 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1991) .................... 16 
State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003) ............. 13 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) ................................. 17, 20 
State V. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 792 ~ . 2 d  916 (1990) .......................................... 15 
United States v. Younq, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) ......................................................... 14 
RULES 
I.R.E. 403 .................................................................................................... passim 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Humberto Pasquinal Ortiz appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine. (Appellant's 
brief, p.1.) 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On the evening of January 31, 2007, Officer Jay Wiggins of the Twins 
County Sheriffs Office observed people standing outside a known drug house. 
(Trial Tr., p.82, L.23 - p.84, L.lO.) As Officer Wiggins passed the house, he saw 
a vehicle back out of the driveway, and then exceed the posted speed limit on a 
nearby street. (Trial Tr., p.84, L.2 - p.85, L.21.) Officer Wiggins effectuated a 
traffic stop. (Trial Tr., p.85, L.22 - p.86, L.2.) The registered owner and sole 
occupant of the vehicle was identified as Humberto Ortiz. (Trial Tr., p.86, L.13 - 
p.87, L.24.) Ortiz appeared to Officer Wiggins to be agitated, nervous, and was 
visibly shaking. (Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.13-17.) Ortiz was unable to provide proof of 
insurance, so Officer Wiggins returned to his patrol vehicle to issue a citation. 
(Trial Tr., p.88, L.18 - p.89, L.3.) While at his vehicle, Officer Wiggins called for 
Deputy Morgan Case, who is the sheriffs office's narcotics canine handler. (Trial 
Tr., p.89, Ls.4-13.) 
Deputy Case arrived, made contact with Ortiz, and observed that Ortiz' leg 
was shaking. (Trial Tr., p.165, L.19 - p.166, L.6.) Deputy Case deployed his 
canine to sniff the air around Ortiz' vehicle, and the canine alerted on the front 
passenger door. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.18 - p.168, L.19.) A subsequent search of 
Ortiz revealed a lighter, more than $3,000 cash, and what officers believed to be 
a methamphetamine pipe, with a white residue substance inside. (Trial Tr., 
p.169, L.12 - p.170, L.20; p.93, Ls.16-24; p.90, L.23 - p.91, L.12.) A large 
amount of a white crystal substance was visible on the floorboard of the front 
passenger side of Ortiz' vehicle, within arm's length of where Ortiz had been 
seated. (Trial Tr., p.201, L.12 - p.202, L.13.) A torn plastic bag and a vial were 
also located in the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.117, Ls.8-17; p.207, Ls.12-17.) The 
white crystal substance was collected, tested at the state lab, and identified as 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.131, L.18 - p.139, L.14.) 
The substance received by the state lab also included some debris 
collected from the floorboard of Ortiz' vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.134, L.25 - p.135, 
L.3.) Rachel Cutler, the forensic scientist that tested the substance, was unable 
to easily separate the debris from the methamphetamine crystals. (Trial Tr., 
p.142, Ls.13-16.) Cutler reasoned that since the weight of the methamphetamine 
would not amount to a trafficking quantity, and since the amount of the debris 
was "not substantial enough to greatly affect" the total weight, that it was 
unnecessary to separate the debris. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.16-23.) Cutler did 
indicate that the controlled substance "definitely" outweighed the debris, and that 
in her opinion, the debris would be insignificant to the total weight of the 
substance. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.24- p.143, L.6; p.149, L.17- p.150, L.7.) The 
total weight of the crystals and debris, before a sample of crystals was taken for 
testing, was 3.82 grams. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.4-17.) After a small amount of the 
methamphetamine was consumed for testing, the total weight of the crystals and 
debris was 3.71 grams. (Trial Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.140, L.3.) 
In order to establish Ortiz' knowledge of the presence of the 
methamphetamine, educate the jury about the drug culture, and to rebut any 
inference that the methamphetamine in Ortiz' car may have been spilled or 
placed there accidently, the state presented evidence of typical 
methamphetamine use and value. (Trial Tr., p.211, L.10 - p.212, L.9.) Officer 
Kenneth Mencl testified that that the smallest one-hit type of dosage of 
methamphetamine that is commonly sold on the street was "anywhere between 
an eighth and a quarter of a gram," and that a gram would sell for approximately 
$100. (Trial Tr., p.214, L.20 - p.215, L.4.) He also testified more generally about 
typical methamphetamine use. (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.5-21.) 
The defense objected to this testimony, on the grounds that it would be 
"more prejudicial than probative." (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.9-14.) Defense counsel 
appeared to argue that since the precise amount of methamphetamine found in 
Ortiz' car was unknown, and since even a trace amount of methamphetamine 
would be a sufficient quantity under the possession charge Ortiz faced, then 
general testimony regarding methamphetamine use and amounts should not be 
admitted. (Trial Tr., p.210, L.9 - p.211, L.9; p.212, Ls.'tl-24.) The judge 
overruled the objection and allowed the testimony, ruling that the evidence was 
relevant, and "not unduly prejudicial" in violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. 
(Trial Tr., p.213, Ls. 4-20.) 
Ortiz was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine, and I 1 
pled guilty to a second-offense enhancement. (Trial Tr., p.279, L.21 - p.280, L.7; 
p.281, L.13 - p.283, L.lO.) Ortiz filed a timely appeal from his judgment of I 
conviction (R., pp. 189-1 93, 200-202). 1 I 
ISSUES 
Oritz states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err allowing the State to introduce 
testimony regarding typical methamphetamine use, 
packaging, and sales, because this testimony was more 
prejudicial than it was probative? 
2. Did the State violate Mr. Ortiz' right to a fair trial, but 
committing prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments when he misrepresented Ms. Cutler's testimony? 
3. Did the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence and the 
prosecutor's misconduct result in cumulative error depriving 
Mr. Ortiz of a fair trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ortiz failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
determining that the probative value of evidence regarding typical 
methamphetamine use was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice? 
2. Has Ortiz failed to show prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor's 
factually accurate summary of the evidence presented at trial, or the 
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence? 
3. Has Ortiz failed to show cumulative error? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ortiz Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishinq Thai The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion In Admittinq Evidence Of Typical Methamphetamine Use 
At Trial 
A. Introduction 
During trial, the district court permitted the state to present testimony of 
Officer Menci, who testified about the typical use amounts and monetary value of 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.14 - p.214, L.13.) Ortiz objected to this 
evidence at trial, arguing that pursuant to I.R.E. 403, the risk of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighed the evidence's probative value. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.14 - 
p.212, L.24.) The district judge overruled the objection, and Ortiz challenges this 
ruling on appeal. (Appellant's brief, p.1.) Ortiz has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 is a discretionary matter that will 
be disturbed on appeal only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court 
abused its discretion. State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 
(1991); State v. Birkla, 126 ldaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43,45 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Utilized The Proper Standard 
Ortiz first contends that the district court failed to apply the proper legal 
standard to its determination in overruling the defense counsel's objection. 
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) Ortiz objected to the evidence at trial on the grounds 
"that it is more prejudicial than it is probative ..." (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.12-14.) 
Upon overruling Ortiz' objection, the district judge stated, "Of course it's 
prejudicial, but I don't find that it's unduly prejudicial under Rule 403." On appeal, 
Ortiz contends that because the appropriate test under I.R.E. 403 is not whether 
prejudicial evidence is "unduly prejudicial," but whether the risk of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, the district judge 
utilized the wrong standard. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) Ortiz makes a distinction 
without a difference. 
While Ortiz correctly recites I.R.E. 403, he has not shown that the district 
court relied on an improper legal standard. Ortiz' argument relies entirely on the 
fact that the district judge did not recite I.R.E. 403 verbatim, but instead merely 
referenced the rule, stating, in part, "...I don't find that it's unduly prejudicial 
under Rule 403." (Trial Tr., p.213, Ls. 18-10.) Ortiz apparently contends that the 
district judge utilized an improper "unduly prejudicial" test, and not I.R.E. 403, 
despite the fact that the judge specifically cited I.R.E. 403. The more plausible 
interpretation is that the district judge simply described evidence whose probative 
value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice (I.R.E. 403 
standard) as "unduly prejudicial under Rule 403." Ortiz has failed to show any 
other support for his contention in the record, and has thus failed to show that the 
district judge used an improper standard 
D. The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion In Determining That 
The Probative Value Of The Evidence Was Not Substantiallv Outweiahed 
By The Danaer Of Unfair Preiudice 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. State v. Flovd, 125 ldaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 
905, 907 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 ldaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 
348 (Ct. App. 1993). As previously explained by this Court: 
Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The 
rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant 
evidence. 
State v. Martin, 118 ldaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) 
(emphasis in original). 
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. See State v. 
m, 116 ldaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is 
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
is unfairly prejudicial - that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis. Floyd, 125 ldaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. 
The evidence challenged by Ortiz, however, does not tend to suggest a 
decision on an improper basis, and Ortiz has not shown that the district court 
abused its discretion. Ortiz argues that since the precise weight of the 
methamphetamine found in Ortiz' vehicle was unknown, then evidence regarding 
typical methamphetamine use amounts and costs is improper under I.R.E. 403, 
because such evidence would tend to improperly suggest to the jury that the 
weight of the substance found in Ortiz' car (which included some amount of 
debris) was actually the precise weight of the methamphetamine. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.10-I I .) This argument is not supported by the record or logic 
Ortiz appears to contend that the probative value of this evidence was 
limited because Ortiz was not charged with delivery, attempted delivery, 
trafficking, or another charge where weight and distribution would be a specific 
element of the crime. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) However, this view discounts the 
significant probative value of the evidence to the charge Ortiz actually faced 
The prosecutor explained the probative value of this evidence at trial, outside of 
the presence of the jury, while responding to Ortiz' objection to the evidence: 
Your Honor, it [the evidence] is to rebut the inference that the 
defense has, I think, indicated that this goes to whether or not Mr. 
Ortiz knew of the presence of the methamphetamine. And this 
evidence is to rebut any inference that a person who may have 
placed it there wouldn't have placed that amount of 
methamphetamine accidently. This is not a situation where 
someone accidently spills a trace amount doesn't realize that they 
spilled that. 
This, I think, goes to whether or not it would be reasonable for 
anyone else to have placed that and have lost that amount of 
methamphetamine without realizing that. . . they had lost that or to 
have actually intentionally placed it in that particular vehicle. It just 
doesn't make any sense. 
But the jury, where they really don't know anything about the drug 
culture, they are not going to understand the significance of that 
amount of methamphetamine found on that floorboard. So I think 
that it is relevant to show that no reasonable person would have 
accidently or intentionally have left it there for someone else to 
have been in the situation like Mr. Ortiz is claiming. 
(Trial Tr., p.211, L.12 - p.212, L.9.) 
Indeed, Officer Mencl's testimony regarding typical methamphetamine use 
and value was significantly probative in that it provided context for the 
significance of various amounts of methamphetamine. Even taking the most 
conservative view of the evidence, the probative value of the evidence is clear 
and substantial. Before testing, the methamphetamine crystals plus debris 
weighed 3.82 grams. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.4-17.) Cutler testified that the 
methamphetamine "definitely" outweighed the debris. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.24 - 
p.143, L.6.) Even ignoring the other evidence regarding the insignificance of the 
debris relative to the methamphetamine, if the methamphetamine outweighed the 
debris at all, it would weigh at least 1.92 grams (just over one-half of the pre-test 
methamphetamine plus debris weight of 3.82 grams). 
According to Officer Mencl's general testimony regarding 
methamphetamine use and value, such an amount of methamphetamine would 
have a street value of approximately $192, and would constitute between 
approximately 7.5 and 15 one-hit dosages. (See Trial Tr., p.214, L.20 - p.215, 
L.4.) As the prosecutor noted, this was not a "trace amount" of 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.21 I, Ls.18-20.) And as Ortiz points out, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has stated that "[tjhe greater the amount of a controlled 
substance found in a defendant's possession, the greater the inference of 
knowledge and control." State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 152, 983 P.2d 217, 225 
(Ct. App. 1999); (Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
Ortiz has stated no authority that would require the precise weight of a 
controlled substance to be known in order for this inference from Grace to take 
effect. Surely, the amount of methamphetamine found on the floorboard of 
Ortiz's vehicle creates more of an inference of possession under Grace then 
would a smaller amount, for example, a trace amount of minimal value found in 
the vehicle, even if evidence of the two amounts was something other than a 
precise weight measurement. 
At best, Ortiz is pointing out the potential weakness of the evidence 
regarding typical methamphetamine use to the state's case, and making a jury 
argument on appeal. It was clear from the evidence that the precise weight of 
the methamphetamine was unknown. Cutler testified that the weight of the 
substance found in Ortiz' car included some debris. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.4-17.) 
She testified that she could not easily separate the debris from the 
methamphetamine crystals. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.13-23.) It is unclear how, as 
Ortiz appears to claim, evidence regarding typical methamphetamine use might 
unfairly confuse the jury into disregarding the presence of this debris. 
Though the precise weight of the methamphetamine was unknown, other 
testimony provided evidence of the relative amount of methamphetamine vs. 
debris. Cutler testified that the "controlled substance outweighed the debris 
definitely" (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.8-17; p.142, L.24 - p.143, L.6), and that the debris 
was "not substantial enough to greatly affect" the total weight. (Trial Tr., p.142, 
Ls.21-23.) She also answered affirmatively to the state's question regarding 
whether the debris in the substance was insignificant. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.4-7.) 
Also, the actual substance of methamphetamine and debris was admitted as 
evidence. (TrialTr.,p.141, L.15-p.142, L.9.) 
Thus, while the state could not offer evidence of the precise weight of the 
methamphetamine, it could and did offer other evidence regarding its amount. 
Balancing this evidence is the province of the jury. Evidence is rarely so precise 
to the degree of a specific scientific measurement. Such precision is not a 
prerequisite to the admission of evidence at trial, nor does lack of such precision 
condemn evidence to inadmissibility pursuant to I.R.E. 403. One of the very 
purposes of a jury is to determine the facts in a trial, even when the evidence of 
those facts may be imprecise, or even contradictory. This jury was presented 
evidence regarding the weight of the substance containing methamphetamine 
and debris, the relative amount of methamphetamine vs. debris, and the typical 
use amounts and monetary costs of methamphetamine. Officer Mencl's 
testimony regarding the latter was not unfairly prejudicial. 
Notably, Officer Mencl's testimony did not include opinions as to the value 
and significance of the methamphetamine and debris actually found in Ortiz' 
vehicle, and therefore did not tend to suggest the existence of a specific known 
weight and value of the methamphetamine found. Because Officer Mencl 
testified only generally about methamphetamine use and amounts, he made no 
such suggestion. Officer Mencl merely provided a potential tool for evaluation of 
other evidence. It was up to the jury to determine, based on this evidence, how 
or if to utilize this tool. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Mencl's 
testimony regarding typical methamphetamine use and cost. Ortiz has not 
shown a risk of unfair prejudice from this evidence, let alone a risk that would 
outweigh its clear and substantial probative value. 
11. 
Ortiz Has Failed To Establish Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In Relation 
To Any Of The Prosecutor's Comments Durina Closina Araument 
A. Introduction 
Ortiz claims that a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument, which was 
not objected to, misrepresented the evidence, and constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct amounting to fundamental error and a deprivation of his due process 
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.) A review of the record, however, shows 
that the prosecutor's arguments did not misrepresent the evidence, and that in 
making inferences from the facts presented at trial, the prosecutor did nothing 
contrary to what he was entitled to do. Ortiz has thus failed to establish error, 
much less fundamental error, in relation to the prosecutor's closing argument. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero- 
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere 
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or 
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by 
the United States Supreme Court: "[ljt is not enough that the prosecutors' 
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone 
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Evidence 
The Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur 
where the prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence." Darden, 477 
U.S. at 181-82. However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on 
the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or 
conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined 
whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." United States 
v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider the probable 
effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's ability to judge the 
evidence fairly." Id. at 11-12. 
Consistent with Darden and Young, the Idaho Supreme Court has held 
that a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only when the 
conduct is sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. State v. 
Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999). Misconduct by a 
prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct is so egregious or 
inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or could not have been, 
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that it should be 
disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d 127, 140-141 
(1997); State v. Smith, 117 ldaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990); State v. 
Missamore, 114 ldaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ames, 109 
ldaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). With respect to prosecutorial conduct 
in the context of closing argument the Supreme Court has stated: 
The 'consistent and repeated misrepresentation' of a dramatic 
exhibit in evidence may profoundly impress a jury and may have a 
significant impact on the jury's deliberations. Isolated passages of 
a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to the jury as a matter of 
opinion not of evidence, do not reach the same proportions. Such 
arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are seldom 
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation 
frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than 
crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify 
prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not 
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have 
its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy 
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less 
damaging interpretations. 
Donnellv v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974) 
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of 
reviewing a prosecutor's conduct in trial in light of its improvisational nature, 
noting that "in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate 
court] must keep in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 
165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 ldaho 423, 427-28, 725 
P.2d 128, 132-33 (1986)). The ldaho Court of Appeals has further recognized 
"[tjhe right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but 
a fair one," and the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor 
for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991). Applying the foregoing standards to Ortiz' claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct reveals that these claims are without merit. 
Ortiz contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence during his 
closing argument when he said, "[als the criminalist Rachel Cutler told you, that 
debris, as far as the weight of it towards the total weight, was insignificant. And 
so this basically was in the neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight 
full of methamphetamine." (Appellant's brief. p.14, (quoting Trial Tr., p.253, L.25 
- p.254, L.4).) These arguments from the prosecutor, however, simply re-state 
the facts of the case, and discuss reasonable inferences from the facts presented 
at trial. 
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution 
by the trier of fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (citing Herrincl v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose 
"is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the 
evidence." Id. (citing State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d 1002, 
1007 (Ct. App. 1991)). Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable 
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their 
respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003). 
Ortiz first contends that prosecutor's statement, "[als. . . Rachel Cutler told 
you, that debris, as far as the weight of it towards the total weight, was 
insignificant," misstates the evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) The state's 
redirect examination of Cutler, from which the prosecutor's statement arose, was 
as follows: 
[THE STATE]: Now you said that you made some notes and 
at the time that you looked at the substance, that as far as the 
debris was concerned, it was of an insignificant weight as far as 
what you could see in that substance when you first opened up the 
envelope, correct? 
[RACHEL CUTLER]: I just noted that I didn't feel the debris 
was substantially affecting my total weight. 
[THE STATE]: Okay. And you have had a chance now today 
to relook at that baggy and it's a total weight of 3.71, correct? 
[RACHEL CUTLER]: Yes, now 
[THE STATE]: Is it still your opinion that whatever debris that 
there was contained in that baggy would be insignificant? 
[RACHEL CUTLER]: Yes 
Cutler specifically stated that she didn't feel that the debris was 
substantially affecting the total weight. She indicated that she had a chance, the 
day of trial, to again look at the baggy containing the methamphetamine and 
debris. It is in this context, following these questions about the total weight of the 
methamphetamine with debris, that Cutler answered affirmatively when the 
prosecutor asked whether the weight of the debris was "insignificant." Cutler was 
thus clearly referring to weight of the debris "towards the total weight" of the 
methamphetamine, just as the prosecutor had stated in closing argument. 
Ortiz notes on appeal that, "taken in context with her earlier statements, 
Ms. Cutler's statement that the debris was insignificant is not a statement that the 
weight is such a miniscule amount it is insignificant, but that whatever the weight 
is, it is not significant to her results in this case." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) That 
Ortiz draws a different inference from the evidence does not show error, 
however. 
Second, Ortiz argues that the prosecutor's statement, "[alnd so this 
basically was in the neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of 
methamphetamine", misstated the evidence because Cutler never testified about 
the weight of the methamphetamine by itself, and that, in fact, explained that it 
was too time consuming to separate the crystals from the debris, and that she 
could not guess what percentage of the substance was methamphetamine. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) 
While it is correct that there was no evidence at trial pertaining to the exact 
weight of the methamphetamine independent of the debris, Ortiz had not cited 
authority nor provided argument as to why it is prosecutorial misconduct for a 
prosecutor to make a qualified and reasonable inference regarding a weight 
measurement at closing argument, when the precise weight of a substance is 
unknown. Ortiz has not shown why weights or measurements should be treated 
differently from any other type of evidence, from which prosecutors may draw 
reasonable inferences in closing argument. 
The prosecutor did not state, as a fact, that the methamphetamine 
weighed exactly three and a half grams. Nor did he state that the Mr. Cutler 
testified as to an exact weight of the methamphetamine. Instead, he carefully 
qualified this inference as just that, an inference: "and so this basically was in the 
neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of methamphetamine." 
(Trial Tr., p.253, L.25 - p.254, L.4.) The words "basically" and "in the 
neighborhood" indicate an uncertainty, an approximation, and an unavailability of 
an exact measurement. The fact that the precise weight of the 
methamphetamine was unknown did not preclude the prosecutor from properly 
making any reasonable inferences regarding the weight of the 
methamphetamine. The fact that only a trace amount of methamphetamine was 
sufficient for conviction in this case did not preclude the prosecutor from properly 
making any argument that the actual weight of the methamphetamine was 
something more than a trace. 
The prosecutor's summary of the weight of the methamphetamine was in 
fact, well supported by the evidence: 
0 Cutler testified that the "controlled substance outweighed the debris 
definitely." (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.8-17; p.142, L.24 - p.143, L.6.) 
Cutler testified that the debris was "not substantial enough to greatly 
affect" the total weight." (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.21-23.) 
0 Cutler answered affirmatively to the state's question regarding whether 
the debris in the substance was insignificant. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.4-7.) 
The actual baggy, with methamphetamine crystals plus debris, was 
admitted as evidence, which allowed a visual approximation regarding the 
quantity of debris v. methamphetamine crystals. (Trial Tr., p.73, Ls.6-19; 
p.141, L.15 - p.142, L.1.) The state presented evidence regarding the 
visual appearance of methamphetamine crystals, and of the nature of 
some of the debris. (Trial Tr., p.100, L.25 - p.101, L.15; p.142, Ls.15-23.) 
In addition, prior to deliberation, the jury was properly reminded that the 
lawyers in the case are not witnesses, and what they say in their closing 
arguments is not evidence. (Trial Tr., p.243, Ls.9-15.) The jury was further 
cautioned that if the facts as they remembered them differed from the way the 
lawyers have stated them, that they should follow their memory. (Trial Tr., p.243, 
Ls.13-15.) The prosecutor did not encourage the jury to disregard these 
instructions. He simply summarized the facts from trial and drew reasonable 
inferences therefrom. 
To prevail on appeal, Ortiz must demonstrate that the comments he 
complains of were so egregious or inflammatory that they could not have been 
cured by an instruction. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969. Ortiz has 
failed to show that the prosecutor's closing argument was all improper, much less 
that it was so egregious and inflammatory as to be incurable by jury instruction. 
111. 
There Is No Cumulative Error 
Under the doctrine cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
w n s ,  131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Ortiz has failed to show 
that any errors occurred in his trial, let alone more than one, and therefore the 
doctrine is inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115, 
121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been 
shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that would require 
reversal. State v. Gray, 129 ldaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Barcella, 135 ldaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(accumulation of errors deemed harmless) 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Ortiz's judgment of 
conviction. 
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